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Abstract. The concept of institutional complementarity plays an important role in
the comparative analysis of capitalism. It has often been criticised for being too
static and too functionalist, unable to explain change because it would propose a
view of institutional forms fitting perfectly with one another. After having
presented the concept and its interest for comparative capitalism, this article
argues in favour of its usefulness to explain institutional change. However, in
order to be integrated fruitfully into a theory of institutional change, it is
necessary to have a political economy definition of complementarity, which
should not take institutions as some sort of inputs in a production function, but as
socio-political compromises established in historically-specific conditions.
1. Introduction
The concept of institutional complementarity has been widely used in the
historical and comparative institutional analyses of capitalism (Amable, 2000,
2003; Aoki, 1994, 2013; Boyer, 2004; Deeg and Jackson, 2007;Hall and Soskice,
2001; Ho¨pner, 2005),1 in order to express the idea that certain institutional
forms, when jointly present, reinforce each other and contribute to improving
the functioning, coherence or stability of specific institutional configurations,
varieties or models of capitalism. Taking into account complementarities is
important for several reasons. The notion is associated with the idea that
there exist several feasible combinations of complementary institutions; this
runs against the idea of the existence of a ‘one best way’ for institutional
configurations, which would consist of a collection of ‘best practices’ in different
institutional areas. But institutional complementarities also exclude that any
combination of institutions would be possible in a given economy or observable
at a given time.
Institutional complementarity is also an important concept for institutional
change. At first sight, the concept seems ill-fitted to analyse change. Since
∗Email: bruno.amable@univ-paris1.fr
1 Gagliardi (2014) provides a bibliometric analysis of the use of the concept of institutional
complementarity.
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institutional complementarity usually explains the existence and stability
of certain institutional configurations, it should make them more resistant
to change.2 In this perspective, the only change that could be envisaged
would be system-reinforcing. For these reasons, the concept of institutional
complementarity has been criticised for being too ‘static’, that is to say
unable to account for actual institutional change, and too functionalist,
conceiving institutions as fulfilling the role of improving the overall (economic)
systemic performance (Peck and Theodore, 2007). An economic functionalist
view of institutional complementarity coupled with a rational theory of
agents’ behaviour and decisions could not explain why exiting institutional
configurations would be modified: why change something that works well?
But complementarity can work both ways, reinforcing or weakening an
existing institutional configuration (Amable, 2000). The former influence is
emphasised in most of the literature, but the latter is also a possibility worth
taking into consideration for the analysis of institutional change. Once an
institutional form starts to change in a certain direction, it may weaken
the existing ‘positive’, self-reinforcing complementarities with other particular
institutional forms. Beyond a certain degree of change, previously stabilising
complementarities will become destabilising according to the same cumulative
mechanisms that previously ensured the stability of the institutional structure.
A ‘local’ change, affecting a limited set of institutional forms, may exert an
influence in other institutional areas which, in turn, will affect other institutions
through the complementarity links. A chain reaction of institutional changes
may therefore lead to a substantial alteration or even the break-down of a
certain social system. Therefore, the concept of institutional complementarity
is not doomed to support static theories of institutional diversity but can also
be mobilised to explain the weakening and disappearance of some institutional
forms.
However, one may wonder why some institutions would start to change in a
direction that would ultimately affect the stability of the whole institutional
configuration, which brings us back to the question raised previously: why
change parts of a system where all parts already fit perfectly together? In the
theory of varieties of capitalism for instance (Hall and Soskice, 2001), the
stability of the differentiated varieties stems from their economic competitiveness,
which can be achieved via the combination of two sets of institutions, respectively
coordinated for the coordinated market economies, and less (or not) coordinated
for the liberal market economies.3 These mechanisms explain the absence of
2 ‘[I]nstitutional complementarities have [ . . . ] important consequences [ . . . ] there is a tendency for
institutions to reinforce each other, forming an interlocking ensemble [ . . . ] that is resistant to change’
Howell (2003) p.106.
3 The choice of the term ‘coordination’ to characterise one variety is unfortunate since there is
coordination in liberal market economies too, through different channels than in so-called ‘coordinated’
economies.
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convergence towards a unique, presumably liberal, variety that the mainstream
economics view often holds for unavoidable. In this framework, an intensification
of the competitive pressure, as a result of increasing globalisation of economic
relations for instance, would lead to strengthening the respective characteristics
of coordinated and liberal economies. In order to become more competitive, each
variety would have to become even more in conformity with its nature. Taking
into account economic rationality, this process of ‘bifurcated convergence’
(Soskice, 1999) would be, at least partly, understood by agents, who would
therefore have no interest in demanding a radical institutional change, but on
the contrary would press for an intensification of the specific nature of a given
variety.
However, the evolution of non-liberal models of capitalism over the past
decades does not plead in favour of bifurcated convergence. The spread of
deregulation, privatisation or individualisation of the employment relation
has significantly altered varieties of capitalism that relied on regulation, state
intervention or collective bargaining (Jackson and Deeg, 2012). Yet, one has not
observed a generalised convergence towards a market-based model either. The
concept of ‘hybridisation’ (Callaghan, 2010), frequently used to explain how
some organisational or institutional arrangements are imported and adapted
rather than simply grafted onto an existing institutional configuration, provides
a way to account for observed changes but tells very little regarding the reasons
behind actual changes.
This article argues that a theory of institutional complementarity without
economic functionalism and rooted in a political economy of institution and
change is well equipped to analyse the ongoing change in contemporary
capitalism. Next section sums up the importance of the concept of institutional
complementarity in the historical and comparative analyses of capitalism. The
following section addresses the challenges that the issue of change represents
for a theory of institutional complementarity. The third section argues that
a political economy of institutions can overcome the limitations of the
economic functionalist explanations and contribute to a theory of institutional
complementarity and change.
2. Institutional complementarity in comparative capitalism
The concept of institutional complementarity was formulated by Aoki (1994),
following an idea found in Milgrom and Roberts (1992) about organisational
complementarity within a firm. Defining institutions as equilibrium strategies in a
game and using the supermodularity technique developed by Topkis (1998), one
can analyse how the equilibrium strategies of agents in one area is complementary
or conditional on the strategies of other agents in the same or another area. A
game may therefore have several solutions, reflecting different combinations of
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institutions, whose robustness would be enhanced by complementarity between
agents’ optimal strategies.
The most commonly found notion of institutional complementarity is that the
functional performance of one institution is affected by the presence/functioning
of another institution. Reinforcing the influence of another institution or making
up for its deficiencies are the expression of the same idea that two or several
institutions jointly contribute to a given outcome. There is therefore a necessary
reference to the functions that institutions assume within the economic system.
But taking into account these functions does not imply to adopt the functionalist
view according to which institutions appear endure and disappear in direct
relation with these functions.
Although institutional complementarity was not mentioned as such in the
theory of re´gulation until the late 1990s (Boyer, 2005), the idea was present
in some form in the early works.4 The analysis of the historical evolution
of capitalism in the theory of re´gulation is based on the interaction between
two basic social relations, the forms of market competition and the capital–
labour relation (Boyer, 2007), defining a fundamentally unbalanced process
of accumulation. More generally, the viability of an accumulation regime
depends on the compatibility between five institutional forms: competition,
the wage-labour nexus, the monetary and financial regimes, the state and
the type of integration of the national economy into the world system. A
‘surprisingly efficient’ (Boyer, 2007) institutional configuration prevailed during
the Fordist post World War II period (until the early 1970s) wherein a social
compromise between capital and labour was possible. Wage earners accepted
the Taylorist work organisation in exchange for real wage increases according
to productivity gains. The regularity of accumulation was enabled by a highly
regulated financial system, competition was restrained and the Bretton Woods
system stabilised international relations, allowing state intervention through
countercyclical monetary and fiscal policies following Keynesian lines.
The ‘efficiency’ of these complementary institutional forms was manifested
by the full employment, high profits, and cumulative improvements in living
standards that the Fordist capital–labour compromise enabled. However,
the ‘surprising’ element must not be missed. As emphasised in many later
comparative capitalism analyses too (e.g. Martin and Swank, 2012; Streeck and
Yamamura, 2001), there was no system builder implementing a grand scheme.
The complementarities were found ex post.
4 For instance in Boyer, 1981, p.15, our translation: ‘[T]he wage-labour nexus [ . . . ] is only one of
the social forms characterising a capitalist economy [ . . . ]. As a consequence, [its] future configuration
will not depend on its own logic only but also on the relations that this logic entertains with the
transformations affecting respectively the concentration and centralisation of capital, the role of the
state or the international division of labour’.
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Institutional complementarity plays a central role in the comparative analyses
of contemporary capitalism. Aoki (1994, 2001) proposed a theoretical model
of the Japanese economy based on the complementarity between two specific
institutional forms, the Main Bank and the Japanese firm (J-firm). The latter is
characterised by team production: the output of the firm is the result of the efforts
of each member of a team in an uncertain environment. The firm relies on outside
investors to finance the capital necessary to production. These investors cannot
observe the actual output of the firm. Teammembersmust exert a certain effort to
produce output and receive a wage in return. The aim of the firm’s management
is to promote reciprocal effort behaviour between workers, but this can only
be achieved imperfectly because monitoring is imperfect. In such a situation,
it is possible to devise a contingent governance structure where the transfer of
decision making regarding distribution of output residual, i.e. once contractual
payments have been made (to outside investors), and the continuation of the
team are contingent upon the realisation of final output. If the latter drops
below a certain level, an outsider to the team, acting as an ex-post monitor,
becomes the residual claimant and the team is dissolved. This ex-post monitoring
scheme provides incentives for individual workers to provide the necessary level
of effort. This particular ex-post governance mechanism is complementary to
the organisation of production in teams. In other words, the financial system
of Japan is an institutional form complementary to the Japanese pattern of
work organisation. By contrast, the American system associates high-powered
financial incentives with the relative absence of team work in favour of the
individualisation of performance and reward.
Complementarities are also present in the theories of varieties of capitalism
(Hall and Soskice, 2001), explaining the reinforcing mechanisms that lead to
the emergence of two differentiated production systems, one based on the
accumulation of specific skills and patient investment, the other relying on
general skills and fast adaptation to changing market conditions. In the former
type, incentives that reinforce investment in specific skills (stable employment, job
security, social protection . . . ) and institutions that enable long term industrial
strategies (coordination among firms, bank-based financial system . . . ) are
complementary to one another because each institutional form reinforces the
efficiency of the other for a competitive outcome.
Other types of complementarity are present in the analysis of the diversity of
capitalism (Amable, 2003) among OECD countries. In the neoliberal model of
capitalism, product-market competition makes firms more sensitive to adverse
demand or supply shocks. When price adjustments cannot fully absorb shocks,
quantity adjustments matter, particularly concerning the labour force. Therefore,
product market competition leads to a demand for flexibility of employment.
Competitive market pressure also makes firms adapt their business strategies.
This is made possible by quickly reacting financial markets, which favour a fast
restructuring, itself facilitated by flexible labour markets. This economic model
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favours fast adjustment and structural change and therefore entails a high degree
of risk for specific investments. Competition extends to the education system.
A non-homogenised secondary education system makes competition among
universities for attracting the best students and among students for entering
the best universities more crucial.
In the social democratic model, a strong external competitive pressure implies
some flexibility for the productive system, which is not only achieved through
layoffs and market adjustments.5 Retraining of a highly-skilled workforce plays
a crucial role in the adaptability of workers. Protection of specific investments of
employees is realised through a mix of legal employment protection, a high level
of social protection, and an ‘active’ labour market policy. A coordinated wage
bargaining system enables a solidaristic wage setting which favours innovation
and productivity. A centralised financial system enables firms to develop long-
term strategies. The Continental European model possesses some features in
common with the social democratic model. Wage bargaining is coordinated and
a solidaristic wage policy is developed, but not to the same extent as in the social
democratic model.
The South European model of capitalism is based on more employment
protection and less social protection than the Continental European model.
Employment protection is made possible by a relatively low level of product
market competition and the absence of short-term profit constraints due to the
centralisation of the financial system. However, a workforce with limited skills
and education level does not allow for the implementation of a high wages and
high skills industrial strategy.
The Asian6 model of capitalism hinges upon the business strategies of the
large corporations in collaboration with the state and a centralised financial
system, which enables the development of long term strategies. Workers ‘specific
investments are protected by a de facto rather than de jure protection of
employment, and by possibilities of retraining within the corporation. Lack of
social protection and sophisticated financial markets make risk diversification
difficult and render the stability provided by the large corporation crucial to the
social and political acceptability of the model.
3. Institutional complementarity and institutional change
The above characterisations of institutional complementarity could lead one to
believe that they describe a perfect fit of institutions with one another, leaving
no room for change except in a system-reinforcing direction.7 Of course, the
5 Except for the reallocation of the workforce from less to more productive firms.
6 Only OECD countries (Japan and Korea) are concerned by this denomination, not the whole Asian
continent.
7 See also Pagano (2011).
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above-exposed models of institutional complementarity are ideal-types and not
accurate descriptions of real economies. Their aim is to emphasise a certain
number of key characteristics used in the analytical representation of actual
economies, not to reproduce with the utmost fidelity all the possible details of
existing configurations. Using ideal-types in order to analyse the diversity of
capitalism should not lead to the conclusion that actual economies never change
or that existing types have always been there. In the 1970s, economies close to
the neoliberal model such as the Anglo-Saxon countries possessed institutions
inherited from the New Deal period or the compromises established after the
Second World War that made them resemble the Continental European model
from a certain perspective. Capitalism was mostly managerial, the role of finance
and shareholders was limited, capital–labour relations were to a certain extent
corporatist and the role of trade unions was far from negligible. These countries
have experienced a rapid evolution towards the neoliberal model after the 1980s
and the conservative revolution.
This also explains why one should not mistake the historical origins of existing
models of capitalism with the analytical representation of their institutional
complementarities. The historical building of the differentiated models of
capitalism does not necessarily reflect the logic of complementary institutions that
supports their existence. The coherence and fit of institutions with one another
has very rarely, if ever, been the result of a grand design. Most complementarities
have appeared ex post, between institutional forms which appeared at different
periods, created for reasons other than a good fit with other complementary
institutions. For instance, the complementarity found in the Japanese model of
capitalism between an ‘imperfect’ labour market – imperfect according to the
mainstream economics view, that is – and a centralised financial system did
not result from a simultaneous creation of these institutional forms (Streeck
and Yamamura, 2001). Internal labour markets of the Japanese corporation
appeared in the early 20th Century when employers tried to reduce excessive
turnover. The main bank system was implemented after WWII in order to
support national economic developmentalism. The complementarity between
these two forms is more a result of chance than anything else.8 Also, Martin
and Swank (2012) show how macro-corporatism in countries such as Denmark
and Germany has its origins in the will of business to build strong multisector
associations to oppose the threat that democracy represented for their interests
and promote their own agenda. This is ironic since this high level of coordination
8 ‘Within the large corporation, the rights of property owners and employees are interdependent
but indirectly mediated by their respective relation to management. Their coevolution was shaped by a
particular historical sequence of ‘latecomer conservatism’ [ . . . ] that presented inherent tensions present
in the prewar corporate governance models [ . . . ]. The economic complementarities or coherence of
nonliberal corporate governance were not inevitable and resulted from an unintended fit. Nonliberal
models came to ‘hang together’ as institutions were adapted in a piecemeal fashion and took on new
functions within a new institutional environment.’ (Jackson, 2001: p. 126).
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was instrumental in the establishment of a more egalitarian capitalism in the
20th Century. This should not be understood as the irrelevance of the concept of
institutional complementarity when it comes to analysing institutional change.
The relation between institutionally complementary institutions and change
may be envisaged according to two radically different perspectives. A first
view would be to consider that institutional complementarity renders change
impossible or limited to one that would increase the whole fit of institutions,
in the spirit of the bifurcated convergence that increases differences between
liberal and coordinated market economies in the VoC approach of Hall and
Soskice (2001). The evolution of institutions is taken to follow the imperative
of increasing competitiveness of the economy. Competitiveness is taken to grow
with coordination in coordinated market economies, and with liberalisation in
liberal market economies. Therefore, an exogenous change in the environment,
such as a more intense competitive pressure following ‘globalisation’, will
reinforce the distinctive characteristics of the two varieties of capitalism: towards
more coordination or towards amore pronouncedmarket orientation.9 A change
in the ‘wrong’ direction, decreasing coordination in coordinated economies or
increasing market regulation in liberal market economies, would lead to inferior
economic performance and would therefore be opposed by the central agents of
Hall and Soskice’s theory, the firms.
This simple prediction has been contradicted by the evolutions observed in
the archetypal coordinated economy: Germany. As shown in Kindermann (2005)
and Streeck (2011), the key institutions of the German model have experienced
change in a decidedly non-coordinating direction for the past two or three
decades: industry-wide collective bargaining declined and the bargaining system
turned significantly more fragmented and ‘pluralist’; the role and membership of
intermediary organisations, key actors in the coordinated economies, declined
and their internal dynamics had to accommodate rising tensions; the social
model evolved in a more market-oriented and less solidaristic direction; the
bank-industry relationship dissolved and Deutschland AG was disorganised
through a series of legislative reforms of the capital market; German employers
launched initiatives to dismantle the system of industrial relations supposedly at
the root of their competitiveness . . . A remarkable aspect of these evolutions is
that in spite of ‘numerous causal connections across sectoral boundaries, none of
them resembled the sort of counterbalancing negative feedback that one would
expect in a self-stabilising system defending its equilibrium against external or
internal shocks’ (Streeck, 2011: p. 97). The existence of interrelations between
9 ‘We see national political economies as systems which often experience external shocks [ . . . ]. These
shocks will often unsettle the equilibria on which economic actors have been coordinating [ . . . ]. We
expect firms [ . . . ] to modify their practices so as to sustain their competitive advantage [ . . . ]. Thus,
much of the adjustment process will be oriented to the institutional recreation of comparative advantage’
(Hall and Soskice, 2001, eds., pp. 62–63).
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institutional forms did not prevent the German economic system from becoming
more disorganised and less ‘coordinated’.
But it is in fact a characteristic of systemic interdependences that they canwork
both ways. If a change in institutions in one direction can reinforce the systemic
coherence through complementarities, a change in the opposite direction can
lead through the same channels to a general disorganisation of the system and
a mutually dysfunctional collection of institutions where positive externalities
turn into negative ones.
A second view on the relation between institutional complementarity and
change is therefore that complementarities make a system particularly fragile. But
this view raises the question of the origins of the negative change in institutions.
The story told would correspond to the exact opposite of the previous one.
Instead of evolving towards more coherence and stability, the system would
unwind and dissolve, even as a consequence of apparently modest change in
a remote part of the institutional configuration. Institutional complementarity
would thus render a model particularly fragile, all the more so that the
complementary mechanisms are powerful and that the fit between institutions is
tight.
Evolutions towards a market-based model of capitalism have been observed in
non-liberal economies: France and Italy (Amable and Palombarini, 2014; Amable
et al., 2012a, 2012b), Germany (Streeck, 2011), Japan (Lechevalier, 2014;
Magara and Sacchi, 2013), Sweden (Schnyder, 2012) . . . The financialisation of
the economy, financial market development, reforms in corporate governance,
the rise of shareholder power, the decline of collective bargaining, privatisations,
welfare state retrenchment etc. are phenomena that have, to various extents,
affected non-liberal capitalism. The decrease in the involvement of banks in
the direct financing of industrial firms particularly affected Asian, continental
European and social-democratic models. Sweden has rapidly liberalised its
financial system in the 1980s and continued in this direction despite a major
banking crisis in 1991; France has done the same in the 1980s (Amable et al.,
2012a). Germany followed in the 1990s and German banks, like their foreign
competitors, preferred to concentrate their efforts onmarket activities rather than
directly finance industry. This has also affected Japan, which had a system where
banks, while not present in the capital of industrial companies, exercised a dual
role of financing and control and ensured the presence of a stable shareholding.
This stable ownership fell sharply: it averaged 43% of the capital of industrial
firms in 1991, but only 26% in 2002. Also, as in European countries such as
France, financial liberalisation has led to a greater presence foreign investors,
which held 25.5% of the publicly traded in 2007 against 4.2% in 1990 assets
(Isogai, 2012).
Corporate governance has undergone significant changes as a direct result
of the increased priority given to shareholders over employees in determining
the objectives of the firm, focusing on financial returns rather than maintaining
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employment, increased management control and alignment of incentives on the
financial performance of the firm. These elements are a manifestation of the
progressive failure of the compromise characteristic management of managerial
capitalism that was widespread during the Fordist era: the transition from amore
or less informal compromise between management and employees in favour of
an alliance between management and shareholders.
The institutions governing the employment relationship have also been
significantly affected in all non-liberal models. Employment protection legislation
(EPL) for regular employment contracts has decreased significantly in countries
such as Portugal, Spain and Greece,10 but also in Korea and Finland. For
some countries, more than a generalised labour market flexibility, it is a partial
liberalisation affecting the margins rather than the core of the workforce that
has been observed. The level of EPL for temporary contracts has dropped
tremendously in South European countries such as Spain, Italy, Portugal and
Greece, but also in typically ‘coordinated’ economies such as Sweden, Denmark
and Belgium. In Germany in 2013, the proportion of atypical employment (fixed-
term contract, part-time, temporary employment, mini andmidi jobs . . . ) in total
wage employment was 24% (35% for women).11 The proportion of low wage
earners was slightly under 25%, to be compared with 10% in Denmark.12
Asian capitalism was characterised by the importance of the wage relation
defined at the level of the corporation (Yamada, 2000). The job security
(lifetime employment) concerned not all employees but the central part of
the workforce. This practice has declined since the late 1990s; as in many
other countries, the proportion of regular contracts decreased and the number
of precarious employees increased. Atypical contracts accounted for 20%
of Japanese employees in the first half of the 1990s and one third of all
labour contracts in 2005 (Yamada and Hirano, 2012). Furthermore, the non-
regularisation of employees is becoming a hallmark of Japanese wage relation
(Yamada andHirano, 2012). The rise in precarious and non-regular employment
is also observable in Korea (Ok and Yang, 2012). Similarly, the decentralisation
of wage bargaining, that is to say, their evolution towards a level closer to
the firm, has affected all countries where centralised (national) or coordinated
negotiations were important : Sweden (Schnyder, 2012), Japan (Isogai, 2012)
or even France and Italy (Amable et al., 2012a, 2012b). Between 2008 and
2013, the number of sectoral agreements has dropped from 202 to 14 in Greece,
from 1,448 to 543 in Spain13 and from 200 to 46 (2012) in Portugal (Mu¨ller
and Schulten, 2014). Centralised negotiations have increasingly tended to turn
10 See Appendix figures for the evolution of employment protection legislation.
11 Data from Statistisches Bundesamt.
12 Figures for 2010 taken fromRhein (2013). See also Thelen (2014) for a comparison of liberalisation
trajectories in Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands.
13 The number of workers covered by collective agreements in that country has dropped from 12 to
5.7 million during the same period.
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into ways to accept ‘wage moderation’ – in some cases, wage cuts – or labour
flexibility, rather than representing a way to distribute productivity gains to
stabilise the capital–labour compromise as during the Fordist period (Boyer,
2004). Institutional changes in a particular area had consequences in other areas
through complementarities between institutions. Privatisations lead not only to
a change regarding the legal status of the companies that are privatised, but often
also to a change in the type of employment relation for the people who work for
them (Schulten et al., 2008). Privatisations have contributed to weaken macro-
corporatism and thus supported the diffusion of micro-corporatism, more in
line with a neo-liberal model of capitalism. The status of employees has evolved
towards private contracts and self employment and segmentation of the labour
force has increased, with the emergence of a two-tier workforce divided between
core and peripheral workers.
Similarly, the financialisation of economies, strengthening the pressure to
achieve high short-term profitability, has made it more difficult to guarantee a
certain degree of job security for employees. The extension of financial markets
has also led to the provision of private services (insurance . . . ) competing with
public welfare systems. It is impossible to review in detail all the knock-on effects
of institutional change in one area for another institutional area, but Table 1
gives an overview of the destabilising effects of neoliberal structural reforms for
non-liberal models of capitalism.
However, neoliberal structural reforms have been implemented for at least
three decades (financial liberalisation and privatisations started in the 1980s),
and yet diversity of capitalism persists, even if less pronounced than it has been.
The demise of non-liberal models through negative complementarities therefore
seems to be rather slow. A possible explanation is that the tight fit of institutions
posited in the theoretical models never existed in reality. There is much more
slack in actual models of capitalism than what theories can account for (Streeck,
2005). Themodels of institutional complementarity presented in the literature are
ideal-types that simplify a certain number of key features by necessity. This may
explainwhy, in reality, some degree of change is possible without endangering the
system of existing ‘positive’, system-reinforcing, complementarities. A change,
even in the ‘wrong’ direction may not imply a brutal break-up but rather limited
adjustments.
But if slack represents some ‘imperfection’ which explains the loose character
of the model, it cannot be a general explanation of the persistence of some
institutional forms while others change significantly. This phenomenon, dubbed
‘hybridisation’, has been identified for productive models (Boyer, 1998). The
idea is that importing foreign part into a given (productive) system leads to an
adjustment of the imported parts and the importing system to one another. In this
perspective, hybridisation is not a loss of systemic coherence, but the creation of
new complementarities. Applying this idea to macro institutions is not as easy as
it seems. Hybridisation is itself a loose concept when the reasons for successful
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744137415000211
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. Open University Library, on 29 Jan 2017 at 04:06:33, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
90
B
R
U
N
O
A
M
A
B
L
E
Table 1. Structural reforms and institutional complementarity
Structural reforms\
consequences for
institutions
Employment
relation
Product market
competition Social protection Financial system Education system Fiscal policy
Labour market
liberalisation
More
individualistic;
less investment in
co-specific assets
(skills etc.)
Increased demand
for ‘marketable’
skills; increased
precariousness
and downward
wage pressure at
the lower end of
the skill
distribution;
Less quality-based
production as a
result of less
investment in
co-specific assets;
More possibilities
for price-based
competition due
to the relatively
lower wages at
the lower end of
the skill
distribution
Increased demand for
protection against
employment risk
(substitution for
diminished
employment
protection) where
possible.
Less solidarity in
bargaining
(individualisation of
the employment
relationship) implies
more financially fragile
and less
socio-politically
accepted social
protection systems.
Diffusion of precarious or
atypical employment
jeopardise the financing
of social
contributions-based
systems.
Increased demand
for private
insurance
(substituting for
decreased
Employment
protection)
favours the
expansion of the
financial sector
Increased demand
for ‘marketable’
skills favours the
reorientation of
education
systems towards
the satisfaction of
labour market
(firms)
requirements;
Increased leverage
for firms
regarding the
definition of
curricula
Increased
individualisation
and less
solidaristic
bargaining make
redistributive
policies less
socio-politically
stable
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Table 1. Continued.
Structural reforms\
consequences for
institutions
Employment
relation
Product market
competition Social protection Financial system Education system Fiscal policy
Product market
liberalisation
Increased
competition
make firms more
reluctant to grant
employment
stability to wage
earners;
Increased demands
for labour market
deregulation
from firms
Increased
competitive
pressure on firms;
privatisations
favour the
position of
private
oligopolies
Increased competition
increases firms’
demands for lower
social contributions,
which threatens the
financing of social
protection systems
Privatisations
contribute to the
development of
financial markets
makes ‘fiscal
optimisation’
practices easier
and favours fiscal
competition
Social protection
retrenchment
Increased income
risk linked to
labour market
fluctuation; leads
to an increased
demand for
employment
protection where
this is possible
Less protection for
specific assets of
wage earners;
influence on
production
specialisation;
Decrease in social
contributions
Increased demand
for private
insurance;
Increased demand
for ‘marketable’
skills
Decreased public
expenditure and
taxation
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Table 1. Continued.
Structural reforms\
consequences for
institutions
Employment
relation
Product market
competition Social protection Financial system Education system Fiscal policy
Education system
reforms
(privatisation,
increase in
fees . . . )
Increased
differentiation
makes solidaristic
wage setting
more difficult;
increase in
inequality
Less emphasis on
specific skills;
makes some
productions more
difficult
Less support for universal
systems because of
increased
differentiation of the
work force
Increased private
financing demand
for student loans;
Favours
financialisation
Decreased public
expenditure and
taxation
Financial system
deregulation
Increased
importance of
profit targets;
labour
increasingly bears
the costs of
flexibility and
adjustment to the
business cycle
Increased
financialisation of
industrial firms
(profit targets,
short termism
etc.)
Increased competition
from private insurance
systems
Increased supply of
students loans
instrumental to
privatisation of
education systems
Alters the terms of
public borrowing;
increased
importance of
financial markets
Fiscal policy
changes
Less redistribution
makes income
more dependent
on labour market
wages
Macroeconomic
stabilisation
policies more
difficult,
increased
business
cyclicality
Pressures on
retrenchment
Favours financial
sector’s
development
Public education’s
financing more
difficult; favours
increasing
privatisation
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hybridisation – leading to a stable institutional structure – are not spelled
out.
In order to overcome the limitations of this concept, it is necessary to abandon
the focus on the forms that institutions take (centralised or decentralised, market
oriented or coordinated, etc.) in order to assess their complementarity with one
another, and turn to the reasons that will make them complementary to one
another and lead to institutional stability or change. Following Peter Hall’s
advice to avoid ‘crude forms of functionalism’ (Hall, 2005: p. 375), we now turn
to a political economy of institutions to consider different complementarities.
4. A political economy view of complementarities
Political economy and institutions
By political economy, one must understand an approach that analyses the
evolution of societies as the product of the interactions between the economic
dynamics and the evolution of the political balance of power (Amable, 2003;
Amable and Palombarini, 2005, 2009; Palombarini, 2001). A political economy
view of institutions defines them as socio-political compromises. Social groups
(and individuals that compose them) have differentiated interests because of their
different positions in the social structure.14 They therefore express differentiated
political demands, which political actors may or may not satisfy with specific
policies or design of institutions. The decision of political actors will depend on
the political power of the different groups, and their capacity to provide political
support. According to the logic of politics, which is the accumulation of power,
public action is oriented towards the satisfaction of demands coming from the
most politically powerful groups.
Social groups express heterogeneous demands, a consequence of social
differentiation. It is therefore possible to satisfy diverse demands concerning
different dimensions of the social system. However, some demands are partly
or totally incompatible and political actors have to select the interests that will
be preserved and those that will be neglected; the former will be the dominant
interests and the latter the dominated ones. The policies that will be implemented
will depend on the type of compromises that can be established between the
dominant social groups. The set of such dominant groups is called the dominant
social bloc. When such a bloc exists, following the policy strategy adopted by
political actors, social conflict is under control. A break-up of the dominant bloc
is a situation of crisis.
Economic dynamics influences the viability of the dominant bloc, but the latter
cannot be reduced to indicators of the former. There is no strict determination
between economic ‘performance’ and the stability of a given institutional
structure, although poormacroeconomic performancemay imply a growing level
14 Interests as agents perceive them; interests are socially constructed and not ‘objectively’ given.
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of dissatisfaction with the status quo and lead to pressure for change.15 Economic
growth for instance may favour the establishment of social compromises and
reinforce the viability of a given model of capitalism, defined by a combination of
institutional structure, political strategy and dominant social bloc, by increasing
the amount of resources available to political actors and economic agents alike.
This should, ceteris paribus, reduce the contestation of social order and make
the establishment of compromises easier. However, homothetic growth is seldom
a feature of the real world. Distributional issues are central to the way social
conflict can be neutralised and growth implies generally an alteration of the
productive structure and other dynamics that are likely to change the balance
of power between social groups, increasing income and opportunities for some,
implying losses and higher risks for others. Therefore, growth may lead to a
change in expectations and demands coming from groups whose political power
is changing too. Growth may then make the dominant social compromise more
fragile through different channels: the balance of power within the dominant
bloc may change, some groups declining while others grow, leading to new
demands impossible to satisfy within the limits of the current social compromise;
some dominated groups may increase in importance, which would make their
exclusion from the dominant bloc more difficult to sustain. Another aspect is that
growth may alter the conditions under which strictly national compromises may
be stable. Supranational influences may acquire more importance and destabilise
compromises previously established within national constraints.16
The break-up of a dominant social bloc implies to relax the constraints defined
by the existing institutional framework, political strategy and composition of the
dominant bloc in order to extend the space for mediation.
Complementarity and hierarchy of institutions
This political economy definition of institutions and change has consequences for
the definition of institutional complementarity. Two types of complementarity
may be distinguished according to the identity of the agent that considers
this complementarity. For a social group, two institutions are complementary
when their joint presence reinforces the group or protect their interests. Firms’
managers may find financial liberalisation and labour market deregulation
complementary because they jointly contribute to increasing their profit margins:
financial deregulation allows managers to obtain a larger share of value added,
making the wage ‘moderation’ obtained thanks to diminished employment
protection all the more profitable. Wage earners could on the other hand find
that social protection and centralised bargaining are complementary in the
15 Poor macroeconomic performance may also be used as a tool by the proponents of institutional
change, helping them to put across the message that ‘this cannot go on like that’ and ‘something needs to
be changed’, what the structural reform literature calls ‘creating a sense of emergency’ (Boeri et al., 2006).
16 International agreements (European Union, WTO, TRIPs, etc.) imply constraints that can be
contradictory to some of the national compromises and thus destabilise them.
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protection of their interests. Centralised bargaining would promote trade-unions,
whose influence in the management of social protection organisations would be
increased, making this protection more generous for workers.
For political actors, complementarity must be defined differently, in reference
to the support they can obtain from a sufficiently large set of social groups. It
must therefore be defined in reference to the formation of a dominant social
bloc. Complementary institutions are those which jointly contribute to creating
or stabilising a dominant social bloc through the widening of the space for
political mediation.
In both cases, complementarity is definedwith a reference to a function, but the
function differs according to the agents considered. Social groups’ objective is the
promotion of their interests; political actors are interested in obtaining political
support. The two types of complementarities do not necessarily correspond
to the same institutional forms. If for business, labour market deregulation
and financial system liberalisation may be complementary institutions as far
as they jointly contribute to increasing profit margins, they may not be so for the
political leadership. If this leadership looks for a dominant social bloc including
at least some fractions of the wage-earning population, associating labourmarket
regulation or some degree of social protection to financial system deregulation
may be complementary in the pursuit of a dominant social bloc, looking for a
compromise that different groups could consider as acceptable.
Complementarity is therefore not conceived as a ‘technical’ matter, as if
one could simply look at the economic performance induced by the joint
presence of two or more institutional forms according to the equivalent of a
production function. A socio-political complementarity is defined in reference
to stability of the dominant bloc, and it depends on the compatibility between
the expectations and demands of the social groups that compose the bloc. It is
therefore historically specific.
In order to analyse the complementarity between institutional forms in the
context of a given dominant social bloc, another concept, that of hierarchy of
institutions, is useful.
Hierarchy is defined in reference to a social group or to the stability of
dominant bloc. For a group, hierarchically superior institutions are those that
matter most for their interests. For the political leadership, hierarchy is defined
according to the importance that institutional forms possess regarding the
stability of the dominant socio-political compromise. Hierarchically superior
institutions are those whose alteration would imply challenges to the existence
of the dominant social bloc.17
17 If institutions are defined as socio-political compromises (Amable, 2003; Amable and Palombarini,
2005, 2009), changing an institution implies reopening a social conflict, which implies some costs.
Institutions may be more or less easy to implement as a function of the seriousness of the conflict.
Some institutions may become ‘sticky’, i.e. difficult to change, even when powerful interests wish them
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For instance, the institutions of the wage-labour nexus have played a central
role in the socio-political compromises of modern capitalist economies since the
end of World War II (Boyer and Mistral, 1983; Delorme and Andre´, 1983). In
the Fordist period, they have made a specific form of social alliance between
business management and labour possible (Boyer, 2013). These institutions are
still the central elements of the dominant social compromise in most developed
countries.
Hybridisation in France
One may then consider some of the institutional changes within non-liberal
capitalism from this perspective. The economic dynamics in the 1970s and 1980s
has rendered the socio-political compromises inherited from the post-war Fordist
period more fragile. Economic and technological development led to a vanishing
of the typical Taylorist production organisation, with consequences regarding
the structure of the blue collar workers and the shrinking of the mass-production
worker population. De-industrialisation has also affected the skilled segments of
the blue collar population, and led to a weakening of the traditional industrial
trade union base. Internationalisation of firms made them less dependent on the
domestic capital–labour compromises and opened the possibility for them to
participate actively to a competition between economic systems.
These evolutions created new opportunities for some social groups and led
to new demands for further trade and capital liberalisation which reinforced
the previously-mentioned trends, making tax evasion easier to implement.
Financialisation increased the relative power of financiers and managers and
decreased that of labour (Boyer, 2013), which reinforced the pressure for
liberalisation and flexibilisation of the employment relationship. These changes
meant a significant alteration of non-liberal capitalism, which affected first
the institutional forms which were of relatively secondary importance for the
preservation of the dominant bloc in countries close to the European models,
such as France (Amable, 2003; Amable et al., 2012b): the financial sector,
product maket competitition, etc. The will to preserve the dominant bloc and
thus political support has led political actors to preserve the institutions on top
of the hierarchy of institutions: labour market institutions and social protection,
until demands for ‘structural reforms’ in these areas became more pressing.
The case of France is a good example of the limits of this strategy. In
the early 1980s, France had two social alliances with differentiated demands
which competed for the role of a dominant bloc (Amable, 2014; Amable and
Palombarini, 2014; Amable et al., 2012a, 2012b): the Left bloc, which gathered
a majority of the employees of the public sector and the bulk of the working
to change because minority interests are protected by other institutions (constitutional rights . . . ) which
themselves are socio-political compromises whose questioning would imply substantial social and political
costs.
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classes; the Right bloc gathered the mean and superior income classes of the
private sector, self-employed professionals, self-employed workers (shopkeepers
and craftsmen), as well as a majority of farmers. These two blocs started to
break-up during the 1980s and 1980s around issues linked to labour market
reforms and European integration. The wage-earning fraction of the Right bloc
was reluctant to see the implementation of radical labour market deregulating
reforms which the more affluent and self-employed parts of the bloc asked
for.18 On the Left, the working classes opposed European integration and the
‘modernisation’ of the French economy (i.e. adaptation to the single market)
that it implied for employment protection, the welfare state and the possibility
to implement Keynesian policies.
The Left and Right governments were therefore led to implement reform
strategies that took into account the difficulties of their respective social bases.
As shown by the consequences of liberalisation in Table 1, the employment
relationship and the social protection system were bound to be affected by
liberalisation implemented in the other institutional areas sooner or later.
On the Left, the ‘modernisation’ affected first the institutional areas that
were not too sensitive for the socio-political basis of the left, i.e. not too high
up in the institutional hierarchy of the left bloc (social protection and labour
rights). Deep transformations affecting the financial and corporate governance
system were thus traded against some extensions of employment protection,
an increase in public employment and the 35-hours week, itself an ambiguous
reform which decreased the duration of the legal working week while at the
same time extending the flexibility of work organisation. The logic behind those
reforms was the achievement of a transformation of the French model into
a neoliberal/social hybrid model, whose stability is highly questionable if one
considers the complementarity between institutions (Amable, 2003, 2009; Deeg
and Jackson, 2007).
The Right dropped during the 1990s and 2000s the radical Thatcherite
strategy it briefly adopted in the early 1980s because it antagonised part of
its social base. The issue of labour market flexibilisation was particularly
sensitive. The leading politicians on the Right acknowledged that the strong
demand for a liberalisation and flexibilisation of the labour market of one
part of the right electorate was difficult to reconcile with the demands for
security expressed by private sector employees. This fundamental contradiction
explains the cautiousness with which labour market reforms were undertaken
until Sarkozy’s presidency. The only significant attempts to flexibilise the labour
market were always made at the margins, i.e. on targeted labour force groups.19
18 In 1978, only 28% of the individuals with a centre-right, right or far-right political leaning were
opposed to the proposition to forbid firms from laying off employees until they had found alternative
employment (1978 French electoral survey).
19 Such tempted adjustments at the margins are for instance Villepin’s CPE (contrat premie`re
embauche) for under 25 year’s workers and CNE (contrat nouvelle embauche) for very small firms:
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Even Sarkozy, expected to be a radical neoliberal reformer,20 promised that
the labour market flexibilisation he wanted to implement would be based on
‘flexicurity’ (i.e. flexibility combined with income security) and not purely and
simply flexibility. The Great Depression of 2008 and the rise of unemployment
it provoked prevented the implementation of this strategy.
The strategy of the main ‘left’ party, the PS, changed with the Hollande
presidency after 2012. The renewal of the social base of the left, expected since
the 1980s by some fractions of the PS and theorised by a think tank close to the
PS (Terra Nova, 2011), meant that the importance of groups more favourable
to labour market flexibility (managers, high skilled private and public sector
employees . . . ) had grown while that of groups opposing flexibility (blue collars,
clerks . . . ) had diminished. The objective of the PS-led government became then
to follow the footsteps of Schro¨der and implement more substantial labour
market reforms in the spirit of the Hartz reforms of the early 2000s.
The various attempts to preserve socio-political support from groups
expressing increasingly differentiated and sometimes contradictory demands
explain the ‘hybridisation’ of non-liberal models of capitalism: the
implementation of neoliberal reforms in some institutional areas has altered
the models but not turned them into liberal varieties. The question is whether
these ‘hybrid’ models represent a possible equilibrium in terms of institutional
complementarities. The hybrid of neo-liberal and social democratic model that
would come out of the attempts to flexibilise the labour market while preserving
social protection may not represent a solution in this respect. This model of
capitalism would include product and financial market deregulation, labour
market flexibility, ‘active’ welfare state and investment in education and high
technologies (Amable et al., 2012a) in a context of fiscal austerity imposed by
the necessities of European integration. Fiscal austerity (and tax competition) will
imply cutbacks in public expenditure, and above all social expenditure, which
is in contradiction with the welfare state expansion implied by the flexicurity
strategy. The decline of centralised or coordinated bargaining in favour of
the individualisation of labour relations, partly resulting from an increase in
the competitive pressure in product markets, will mean the end of solidaristic
wage setting and a growth of income and wealth inequalities. This will have
for consequence an aggravation of divergences regarding the size and extent
both contracts were intended to allow firms to lay off workers during the first 2 years, after what the
contract would have became a permanent contract. However, the CPEwas never implemented givenmajor
street demonstrations, whereas the CNE was suppressed only a few months after being implemented. See
Amable (2015).
20 Our analysis of the concessions made by Sarkozy in order to take into account the contradictions
between expectations coming from his own social base differ from the rather normative analysis of Levy
(2008), for whom there is no alternative to the neo-liberal transformation of the French model: ‘sooner or
later, French leaders, whether Sarkozy or an eventual successor, will bite the bullet and make the changes,
however painful and unpopular, that are necessary to restore the country’s economic vitality’ (p. 432).
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of redistribution and social policies, making it more difficult to reach a socio-
political equilibrium.
5. Conclusion
The concept of institutional complementarity is useful to understand how specific
institutional forms interact in a given social system, giving it a certain internal
coherence. As mentioned above, this notion is sometimes considered in a static
way, as if institutions were perfectly fitting with one another in a given system. In
such a perspective, change is either impossible, because there would be no reason
to change something which is ‘efficient’, or has a radical effect: a modest change
in one institution would make the whole system collapse by the unwinding of
the previously ‘positive’ complementarities. But as underlined by Streeck (2005),
a concept of institutional complementarity must leave space for institutional
change which is neither minor nor a total breakdown of the system. Current
comparative capitalism empirical analysis shows significant institutional change
different from a complete redesign of institutions.
This article has argued that an analysis of such a process, considered by
some authors as the ‘hybridisation’ of economic systems, is possible when, as
already mentioned by Streeck (2005), one relinquishes the functionalist view
that institutions must be complementary with one another with respect to
economic performance or some measure of systemic efficiency that would be
a shared of all agents in the system. Based on a political economy theory of
institutions and taking into account the historically specific conditions defining
the pattern of complementarity between different institutional forms and the
hierarchy of institutions of the different social groups, the concept of institutional
complementarity, understood in its political economy dimension, can help
to analyse the decomposing or recomposing/hybridisation of institutional
architectures. Contrary to most comparative capitalism analysis, this article
has proposed a concept of institutional complementarity centred on the
stability, or lack thereof, of the social blocs that support the existing
institutional arrangements. The evolution of these blocs conditions institutional
change.
Adopting such a perspective requires going beyond the consideration of the
forms that institutional change may take, in order to analyse the reasons for
this change. Considering the complementarity of institutions with respect to
the political stability of a certain institutional architecture, this article has shown
how a certain hybridisation of the French model of capitalism could be explained
by the attempts of political leadership to either renew or stabilise the social base
necessary to their own political stability, under the influence of external factors
onwhich the political actors had only a partial influence. Hybridisation ofmodels
and institutional change in general are therefore far from being falsifications of
the existence of institutional complementarities.
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Appendix Figure 1. (Colour online) Employment protection Legislation indicators
for regular contracts, OECD countries, 1985 to 2013.
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Appendix Figure 2. (Colour online) Employment protection Legislation indicators
for temporary contracts, OECD countries, 1985 to 2013. Data source: OECD.
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